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The European Commission’s announcement of the European Transparency
Initiative (ETI) pushed the debate on lobbying transparency in Brussels up the
agenda. Here, Will Dinan looks at the main protagonists in the lobbying
debate, including the roles played by ALTER-EU and by the lobbying industry.
In March 2005, the European Commission, somewhat unexpectedly, launched
the European Transparency Initiative (ETI), kick-starting what is arguably the
first comprehensive debate on the role of lobbying and transparency in
decision making in the European Union. The ETI presented an ideal
opportunity to push for greater transparency and accountability within the
EU and in April 2005 the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics
Regulation (ALTER-EU) was born.
The origins of ALTER-EU can be traced back to late 2004 when a number of
civil society organisations sent an open letter to the European Commission
calling for reform of its practice of granting privileged access and influence
to corporate lobbies.1 This was the result of a shared realisation that big
business was enjoying disproportionate influence within the Commission to
the detriment of other stakeholders, particularly those representing social
and environmental causes.
While the open letter to Commission President José Manuel Barroso was
destined to have no impact on EU policy, it highlighted a shared critique and
experience of the Commission’s dealings with outside interests. A workshop
on lobbying reform early in 2005 brought together many of the key
organisations that would help to develop the ALTER-EU coalition. More than
30 civil society groups took part, emerging with a strong sense of shared
purpose that lobbying reform was necessary, desirable, and achievable. All
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those involved understood that this would be a long campaign and that the
prevailing orthodoxy regarding the legitimacy of secretive lobbying practices
would not easily be reversed. The name adopted by the coalition was carefully
chosen to reflect the need for change. But it also reflected a shared belief in
the European ideal and a collective determination to secure a more
democratic and accountable EU.
Key to this campaign was a credible lobbying-disclosure system which
participants agreed had to be mandatory, must include detailed financial
reporting, and which could be easily accessed and searched by members of
the public. This remains ALTER-EU’s position and the experience of the
Commission’s lobby-transparency register to date has reinforced this belief.
Enter Commissioner Kallas...
The debate on lobbying reform was thrown into sharp relief following a
landmark speech in 2005 by Commissioner Siim Kallas, responsible for
Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud. For the first time on record a
serving Commissioner acknowledged some of the serious problems related
to EU lobbying:
At the moment there are about 15,000 lobbyists established in
Brussels, while around 2,600 interest groups have a permanent office
in the capital of Europe. […] But transparency is lacking. There is no
mandatory regulation on reporting or registering lobby activities.
Registers provided by lobbyists’ organisations in the EU are voluntary
and incomprehensive and do not provide much information on the
specific interests represented or how it is financed. Self imposed codes
of conduct have few signatories and have so far lacked serious
sanctions. Lobbyists can have considerable influence on legislation,
in particular on proposals of a technical nature. Their lobby is mainly
directed to the Commission and the Parliament. But their
transparency is too deficient in comparison to the impact of their
activities. (Emphasis added)2
This speech provoked a furious reaction among the lobbying fraternity in
Brussels. Clearly many Brussels insiders had not seen this policy coming.
Indeed, some Commissioners appeared equally taken aback by what was said.
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This created a political opportunity for ALTER-EU. The coalition was formally
launched in July 2005 and Kallas attended the inaugural event. He even
appeared receptive to some of the arguments put forward by the coalition
about the weaknesses of voluntary measures. But he was non-committal in
terms of how the ETI might progress, suggesting the Commissioner might be
stepping back from his bold opening gambit.
There was indeed something of a backlash against the proposals. Commercial
lobbyists sensed a real threat to business as usual and mounted an attack on
those supporting transparency and disclosure, including ALTER-EU. John
Houston, then chair of the European Public Affairs Consultancies’ Association
(EPACA) and chief executive of Houston Consulting, repeatedly accused ALTER-
EU of having an anti-business agenda and not being transparent about its
funding. Such allegations were unfounded, but were designed precisely not
to engage with the substance of the transparency debate.
In the face of mounting criticism from the ‘usual suspects’ in Brussels,
particularly on the question of whether any lobbying register should be
voluntary or mandatory, Kallas began to shift ground. Statements from his
office appeared to be designed to appease the lobbyists. Progress on lobbying
reform seemed to hinge on getting the professional consultants to engage,
and the Commission tried to ensure their cooperation by offering significant
concessions. While the lobbying trade associations, the Society of European
Affairs Professionals (SEAP) and EPACA, were denying that the lobby industry
had anything to hide, others made no such pretence. Lobbying veteran Daniel
Guéguen predicted that: “in the future […] we will tend to adopt ever tougher
lobbying strategies […] that will probably involve practices such as
manipulation, destabilisation or disinformation”, neatly exposing why
mandatory transparency and disclosure were required.3
As the Commission was launching a consultation (following a Green Paper in
May 2006) on the ETI, Washington was experiencing a major scandal over the
lobbyist Jack Abramoff and his connections, particularly within the Republican
Party. Kallas used this triumph for the US lobby disclosure system (without
which Abramoff would never have been exposed or convicted) to argue that
mandatory disclosure was no guarantee of ethical behavior. This bizarre logic
illustrated the pains the Commissioner was prepared to go to in order to keep
the Brussels insiders onside with the ETI. It was clear that Kallas had either
been reined in or had caved in on the issue of a mandatory and robust register.
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What emerged from the consultation responses was a rather mixed picture
that failed to deliver a clear mandate for the Commission. There was little
agreement among the responses, with many submissions reflecting the
interests of the respondents. Everyone of course wanted more transparency
– but there were diverging views on how best to achieve this.
The consultation did elicit widespread support for a reporting system that
would apply to the Commission, Parliament, and Council and be easily
accessed online by the public. There was also support for an independent
watchdog to oversee this system, though many also wanted the Commission
and Parliament to take responsibility for this. Interestingly, there was much
greater support for a mandatory register than one might have anticipated
from reading the Brussels lobbying trade press.
Lobbying for lobbyists
The lobbyists’ lobbies made up of SEAP and EPACA – who led the charge for a
voluntary system – continued to protest. In an attempt to beef up self-
regulation, EPACA introduced an expert advisory panel, drawn from senior
public-affairs figures, to provide external scrutiny of the organisation’s code
of conduct and investigatory procedures. This idea was borrowed from the
UK, where the lobbyist organisation APPC had created a similar set-up in
response to political pressure and public criticism. But this simply underlined
the limited transparency and accountability provided by such a model. Indeed
EPACA’s advisory panel has only dealt with two complaints, with both rejected
as unfounded.4
While the Commission analysed the consultation replies, a rather surprising
split emerged in the lobbying community as EPACA suddenly endorsed a
mandatory register in principle, while arguing for limited disclosure within
such a framework. In effect the terms of the debate in Brussels had shifted
from initial scorn and dismissal of the ETI and lobbying disclosure, to
widespread (at the time apparently implacable) resistance to any binding
proposals, to a situation where many interested parties were either in favour
of a mandatory system, or willing to work within such parameters.
During this period the lobbying industry was working to shape the next phase
of the ETI. Kallas heard representations from a number of bodies, including
the UK lobbyists’ trade association in London. They were concerned by
financial disclosure, and the possibility that a lobbying register in Brussels
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would lead to similar measures being implemented throughout Europe.5
EPACA was also keen to influence the Commission’s thinking on whether
lobbyists should disclose their fees and financial information related to
lobbying activities. Houston, the chair of EPACA, tried to position his
organisation as being transparent and supporting registration of all lobbyists,
but fiercely resisted mandatory publication of “commercially sensitive or
confidential financial information”.6
This issue came to dominate deliberations on how to implement a lobbying
register. EPACA lobbied hard for weak financial disclosure and this – as would
later become clear – resulted in major concessions from the Commission.
The ETI communication was published in March 2007 with the Commission
announcing that a voluntary lobbying register would be launched in 2008,
including requirements for financial disclosure. It is clear that the
Commission’s softly-softly approach had secured the support of key factions
of the Brussels lobbying industry. The question remains, at what cost? While
the Commission register launched in June 2008 probably signalled the
beginning of the end for self-regulation for Brussels lobbyists (including
lobbying consultancies, corporate lobby groups, think tanks, law firms, and
NGOs), the voluntary nature of the scheme and the limited reporting
requirements meant the register could not deliver proper transparency,
making scrutiny all but impossible.
Kallas said: “All these groups or bodies are invited to register publicly whom
they represent and what their objectives are... to declare funding sources and
major clients. This ensures the Commission as well as the public can identify
and assess the driving forces behind positions taken and interests
presented”.7 The confident announcement belied widespread doubts about
how effective this scheme could be. Kallas remained “100 per cent confident”
that the register would succeed. But political ‘wriggle room’ was retained as
the Commission pointedly refused to say what precisely the criteria were for
judging the success of the voluntary approach.
The requirements for financial disclosure proposed by the Commission were
nevertheless objectionable to many lobbyists, some likening transparency to
voyeurism. Kallas retorted that “facts on funds invested in lobbying [are a]
meaningful indicator of the importance of the issues at stake... Nobody would
pay real money for lobby services without expecting something in return –
and that ‘something’ is influence”.8 As discontent among lobbyists continued,
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Kallas drew a line in the sand: “There is no point in lobbying against a decision
already taken... the profession therefore has two options – the first... is to work
against the initiative, in which case self-regulation will prove a failure, leading
us towards mandatory registration, for which there is probably sufficient
support in both the European Parliament and in the broader public”.9
According to internal Commission notes from a meeting held on 13 December
2007, the Commission had already guaranteed to commercial lobbyists that
the requirements for financial disclosure would not be expanded. According
to the minutes of the meeting with EPACA, “Vice-president Kallas tried to
reassure his visitors by underlining that the Commission had no interest at
toughening its approach”.10
The possibility of more meaningful disclosure increased when in May 2008
the European Parliament voted for a mandatory lobbying register with full
financial transparency and including the names of lobbyists. How to reconcile
the positions of the Commission and Parliament on this issue still remains an
open question and suggests that the shape and scope of an agreed common
lobbying register is not yet fully decided.
On a roll? How the lobbyist register has registered
The launch of the Register of Interest Representatives in June 2008 was
greeted with mixed reactions. While ALTER-EU remained critical of the
voluntary nature of the system, the limited requirements for financial
reporting, and the fact that the register excluded the names of lobbyists
(memorably likened to a telephone book without any names), the coalition
urged all its members to comply with the register. ALTER-EU encouraged full
declaration of lobbying expenditures and identification of the people involved
in lobbying on behalf of member groups. This was done to demonstrate to
the Commission that a more complete lobbying declaration was quite
feasible, and give the lie to some of the spurious claims put forward by
commercial lobbyists about the bureaucratic burden of such compliance.
Many of the lobbying companies complaining about the difficulties of
registering detailed financial and personnel information in Brussels had
managed to do so in the USA, where such disclosure is mandatory.
Some of the early entries on the Commission’s register provoked dismay.
Seasoned lobbyists scoffed at the naïvety of registrants disclosing more
information than was required under the scheme. Many Brussels lobbyists
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adopted a wait-and-see approach. It soon became clear that the Commission
was more concerned with the numbers signing up to the register than with
issues of the quality or accuracy of the filings. What emerged was a rather
predictable scenario of low compliance and low-quality data. It was also clear
that Kallas and his team were committed to calling the register a success and
the evaluation was de facto a fait accompli.
The Commission could not, however, risk the register falling into disrepute and
ridicule. The registrations of fake Italian bankers and Irish cheerleaders, for
example, caused some amusement for observers but more serious questions
about the reach and reliability of the register also started to emerge. The entry
by one of the largest lobbyists in Brussels, CEFIC, the chemical industry trade
association, suggested that CEFIC devoted less than €50,000 to lobbying. This
was an absurdly low figure and a subsequent complaint (by an ALTER EU
member group) was upheld by the Commission. CEFIC was temporarily
suspended from the register, but other suspect registrations (like those of
BusinessEurope and BAT) were approved by the Commission.
Another cause for concern during the pilot phase of the voluntary register
was a de facto boycott by think tanks and law firms. Something of a war of
words broke out between Commissioner Kallas and Giles Merritt, secretary
general of the Friends of Europe think tank, on whether or not they should be
considered as lobbyists (see also Chapter 4).11 Law firms quietly eschewed the
register arguing that they had a privileged status and their clients had a right
to confidentiality – even though the work in question was not of a ‘legal’
nature. In effect, this means that secrecy continued to surround this
important dimension of public affairs in Brussels. Indeed a perverse effect of
the Commission’s transparency drive is that in practice any interest wishing
to avoid scrutiny or publicity can simply retain a law firm as a lobbyist, safe in
the knowledge that this relationship will not be made public under the
current disclosure system.
ALTER-EU closely monitored the pilot phase of the lobby register, hosting an
expert workshop on lobbying transparency and publishing a detailed analysis
of the register. Sheila Krumholz, executive director of the US Center for
Responsive Politics (publishers of the respected opensecrets.org website)
remarked that “the biggest problem with the EU register was that it was
voluntary and that there are problems with the comparability of data”.
Krumholz argued that the current EU system gave the public “false
confidence” that there was proper transparency and oversight.12 In June 2009
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ALTER-EU published its study of the first year of the register, concluding that
less than one in four lobbyists had voluntarily joined the scheme. It found:
The reliability and comparability of the data is fundamentally
undermined by the arbitrariness of how lobby expenditure is being
calculated. There appears to be significant under-reporting, and mis-
reporting. In addition to underestimating in-house lobby expenditure,
the register contains a wide range of loopholes that prevents real
visibility around the size and nature of the lobbying activities of large
firms. Not many registrations offer anything approaching full
disclosure of the kind that should reasonably be expected of
companies and industry groups engaging in lobbying in Brussels.13
Conclusions: transparency delayed
Despite the evident flaws in the trial phase of the lobby register it came as
no surprise that the Commission pronounced in October 2009 that the
voluntary approach had been a success and would be continued. The
Commission offered a few minor sops to its critics, including adjustments to
the banding of financial reporting to close some loopholes (but probably
opening new ones) and a new category for think tanks. The Commission also
pledged to pursue the question of how law firms engaged in lobbying could
be brought into the register, and to work with the Parliament on finalising a
joint register for both institutions.14
It is evident that the Commission’s satisfaction with the voluntary register is
not universally shared. Some stakeholders and MEPs have criticised the
Commission for not sufficiently strengthening the register. A caucus of pro-
transparency MEPs was formed in the new parliament elected in June 2009
– although how effective this group can be in shaping the common register
remains to be seen. What is clear is that some of the design flaws in the
current register are likely to be revealed as unsustainable in the long term.
In reviewing the near five-year debate on lobbying disclosure it is striking that
not one decent principled argument has been offered against mandatory
registration and disclosure. While there has been plenty of rhetoric about the
desirability of voluntary approaches, no one has yet answered the key problem
with this approach: what to do about those who do not register – who are most
likely to be those with most to conceal? This remains a fundamental weakness
alter-eu 147
of the system in place. It is also unfortunately the case that the register is not
comprehensive, it is not properly audited and checked (so data must be treated
with some caution), leaving a weak form of transparency and arguably
misplaced confidence that there is now sufficient oversight of lobbying.
It has been a long and often frustrating battle to get even the current
disclosure regime in place. Industry opposition is deep-rooted and this clearly
had an impact on the ambition of the ETI and the design of the register. There
remains a risk that the debate on lobbying disclosure could now drift and even
stall – even though the issues surrounding transparency, accountability, and
influence in the policy process in Brussels remain. The Commission is
convinced that a culture change is underway. Time will tell. Rather than the
beginning of the end of lobbying secrecy it is more likely that we are
witnessing the end of the beginning of this process. Lobbying in Brussels
remains politically significant and is not transparent. As long as a voluntary
approach is pursued this will allow lobbyists to choose not to disclose
information about their activities. The need for a strong campaign to promote
disclosure and accountability is as pressing as ever. ALTER-EU will continue to
champion this cause in the hope that transparency delayed does not
necessarily mean transparency denied.
William Dinan is a founder member of Spinwatch and a Lecturer at the
University of Strathclyde.
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